2 June 1986

EMORANDUM FOR:	Office of Congressional Affairs
ROM:	C/MSRB/CRD
UBJECT:	Review of WW II Library of Congress Documents
EFERENCE:	OCA 86-1754
	iewed the attached sampling of WW II Library of Congress
cuments.	
	than passing references to procuring material for OSS, we found
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